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EMPLOYMENT LAW-SEXUAL HARASSMENT-A POLICE OFFICER
ACTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW FOR PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C. §
1983 WHEN HE SEXUALLY HARASSES A COWORKER WHOSE SHIFT HE
SUPERVISES, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER LACKS ANY AUTHORIY TO
HIRE, FIRE, OR MAKE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE

COWORKER-Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20 (3d Cir.
1997).
Plaintiff-appellant, Cheryl Bonenberger, was employed by the
Plymouth Township Police Department as a dispatcher from February 1993 until April 1994, when she quit due to alleged sexual harassment by her acting supervisor, Sergeant Joseph La Penta. See
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1997). Although Sergeant Carbo evaluated Bonenberger's work and had the
power to hire and fire her, when Carbo was not present La Penta was
responsible for supervising Bonenberger and other dispatchers by
arranging their duties and determining their break schedules. See id
at 22, 23 n.3. Thus, when the other supervisors were off duty, La
Penta alone had control over the dispatchers. See id at 22.
Plaintiff-appellant alleged that she was consistently accosted by
La Penta while at work and had to endure unwelcome sexual touchings such as buttock pinching and breast fondling. Several other
members of the police department allegedly witnessed the incidents
of harassment, including Sergeant Carbo, whose duty it was to investigate such behavior. See id at 26, 27 n.7. On one occasion, while
Bonenberger was having a conversation with Sergeant Carbo and although she protested, La Penta touched Bonenberger's breasts. See
id. at 26. Sergeant Carbo's only reaction was to smile. Later, La
Penta grabbed Bonenberger's buttocks in front of three other officers, including Sergeant Galetti, who was also responsible for investigating incidents of harassment. See id at 26, 27 n.7. This incident
was confirmed by the police department's own internal investigation.
See id at 22. Shortly after Sergeant Galetti witnessed La Penta's advances, the police department modified its sexual harassment policy
to protect dispatchers. See id at 26-27.
Bonenberger brought both federal and state law claims in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against the Plymouth Township Police Department, Plymouth Town-
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ship, and Sergeant La Penta. See id. at 22. Specifically, Bonenberger
asserted that La Penta violated her rights to equal protection of the
law, both officially and as an individual, and that the police department also violated those rights by its failure to discipline La Penta.
See id. at 23. The plaintiff-appellant further claimed that the police
department violated her rights under Title VII in failing (1) to stem
La Penta's quid pro quo behavior and (2) to reform the hostile work
environment. See id. Moreover, Bonenberger charged the sergeant
with intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. See id.
Finally, Bonenberger brought a claim against the police department
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. See id.
The district court granted the motions of the defendantsappellees for summary judgment on each of the federal law claims.
See id. at 22-23. The court reasoned that because La Penta did not
have the authority to hire or fire Bonenberger, he was not acting under color of state law and thus could not be liable for a § 1983 claim.
See id. at 23. The district court also decided that the police department was not liable under § 1983 because it adequately trained and
disciplined La Penta by both maintaining a sexual harassment policy
and providing regular training to prevent such behavior. See id. at
25. Finally, the district court announced that Bonenberger's Title
VII claim had no merit because the respondeat superior element was
not met. See id. at 26. Upon the resolution of all claims for which
the district court held original jurisdiction, the state law claims were
dismissed because the district court refused to entertain supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See id. at 23 & n.1.
Bonenberger subsequently appealed the decision granting summary
judgment of the federal claims as well as dismissal of the state law
claims. See id. at 22-23.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, examining the record de novo, reversed in part and affirmed in part. See
id. at 23. The appellate court reversed the order granting summary
judgment for the § 1983 claim against Sergeant La Penta, holding
that a police officer acts under color of state law when he sexually
harasses a coworker whose shift he supervises, even though the officer lacks any authority to hire, fire, or make employment decisions
regarding the coworker. See id. at 22, 23. The Third Circuit also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the
police department for the Title VII hostile work environment claim
and reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs state law claims. See id. at 23,
29. Finally, the court affirmed the orders granting summary judgment regarding the Title VII claim of quid pro quo harassment and
the § 1983 claim against the police department. See id.
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Judge Lewis, writing for a unanimous court, first analyzed the
plaintiffs claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id at 23. The
judge began by delineating what is required to maintain a right of
action under § 1983. See id The court explained that liability hinges
upon state action; harassment without color of state law empowering
the perpetrator fails to meet § 1983 requirements. See id In essence,
the Third Circuit elaborated, a § 1983 claim is about abuse of state
authority through a supervisory position. See id at 24. The court
noted, however, that simply being a state employee and committing
a tort on duty does not suffice; official authority must be exercised.
See id

Based on this discussion, the Third Circuit determined that
Sergeant La Penta, although not technically Bonenberger's supervisor, could be held liable for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
The court emphasized the degree of control that the defendantappellee exercised over the plaintiff-appellant when no other supervisors were present, noting that disobedience on Bonenberger's part
would have resulted in insubordination and would have been
grounds for discipline. See id. Judge Lewis distinguished the instant
fact pattern from cases relied on by the trial court that addressed
similar situations. See id In one case, the court wrote, the dispatchers were employed by a private company and not by the police department itself, so that the harassing police officers did not wield any
authority over them. See id. (citing Woodward v. Worland, 977 F.2d

1392 (10th Cir. 1992)). The Third Circuit found another case where
the officers were of the same rank to be equally inapposite. See id
(citing Rouse v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Wis. 1996)).
Unlike either of those cases, the court reasoned, La Penta was the
equivalent of Bonenberger's supervisor and utilized such authority to
harass her. See id.
Judge Lewis noted that to hinge arguments of authority on the
label of being a supervisor would create a "perverse incentive" for
governments to create supervisors without titles in order to avoid liability. See id. at 25. Substantively, the judge wrote, such adherence
to form over function would defeat the purpose of the statutory protections. See id. Finally, the Third Circuit created a test for determining who acts under color of state law, writing that, when the state
"places an official in the position of supervising a lesser-ranking employee and empowers him or her to give orders which the subordinate may not disobey without fear of formal reprisal, that official
wields sufficient authority to satisfy the color of law requirement of
42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 24-25. Applying this principle, the appellate
court determined that Sergeant La Penta could be considered
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Bonenberger's supervisor and thus reversed the grant of summary
judgment in the sergeant's favor. See id, at 25.
The Third Circuit continued the § 1983 analysis by rejecting
Bonenberger's argument that the police department failed properly
to train and discipline its members. See id. The court agreed with
the district court's decision that the Plymouth Police Department
did not act with the "deliberate indifference" that is required for §
1983 to apply. See id Judge Lewis noted that a municipality will only
be liable if supervisors both know of the harassment and act in such
a way as to encourage the employee's behavior. See id Thus, the
judge wrote, because the Plymouth Police Department maintained a
sexual harassment policy that included training for all officers, including Sergeant La Penta, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was appropriate. See id.
Judge Lewis next addressed Title VII issues, beginning with
Bonenberger's claim of a hostile work environment against the Plymouth Police Department. See id, Addressing one of the elements
for a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the Third Circuit determined that respondeat superior liability exists where the state entity
knows of the harassment and does not take sufficient remedial
measures against it. See id, at 26. In this case, the court reasoned,
Bonenberger's direct supervisor, Sergeant Carbo, had actual knowledge of the harassment by La Penta and implicitly approved of it by
taking no remedial action against him. See id, Judge Lewis explained
that in granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court
focused solely on the police department's investigation and on the
letter of reprimand issued to La Penta after Bonenberger left. See id
The judge found the lower court's analysis to be incomplete. See ie
The court emphasized the differences between Bonenberger's account of the harassment and that of the police department's and determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to Title
VII liability. See id at 27. The Third Circuit further elaborated that
merely having a sexual harassment policy in place, without a grievance procedure, is not enough to avoid liability for a hostile work
environment. See i,
Finally, the court examined the issue of quid pro quo sexual
harassment. See id Judge Lewis reiterated the traditional view of
quid pro quo harassment, which normally entails some threat of job
loss or decisionmaking based on submission vel non to the harassment. See id, In this case, the judge explained, the plaintiffappellant knew that the defendant-appellee did not have the power
to fire her or the authority to make decisions regarding her em-
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ployment, even if he made statements to that effect. See id at 27-28.
More specifically, the appellate court noted that La Penta never suggested that Bonenberger's employment depended on accepting his
sexual advances, and thus no exchange of sex for ajob occurred. See
id at 28. Although the plaintiff-appellant proposed a creative theory
of quid pro quo harassment based on constructive discharge, the
Third Circuit reiterated the need for a demand for sexual favors in
return for employment. See id. Judge Lewis thus upheld the decision to dismiss the quid pro quo claim. See id
Clearly this is a difficult and conflict-prone area of the law, as
evidenced by the number of sexual harassment cases the United
States Supreme Court will be hearing this Term. On one hand, taxpayers will despise this case, as it expands the number of state employees who fit under the aegis of civil tights law. Accordingly, it is
the taxpayers who will be forced to compensate victims of harassment propagated by coworkers regardless of supervisory tides. After
all, it is never just the officer who is sued, but the deep-pockets employer as well.
Conversely, the decision is a logical progression and a boon to
women in the workplace who may be harassed by coworkers with
power but without official supervisory tides. To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which seeks to prevent
the abuse of power granted to state officials. As the court noted, to
exempt employees lacking a tide but possessing supervisory power
from the protections afforded by § 1983 would indeed be a
"perverse" effect. Sergeant La Penta clearly commanded power over
Bonenberger, and the Third Circuit made a logical, sound decision
by allowing the plaintiff-appellant the chance to prove her case.
Nicole Hubefeld

